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Abstract 
In four studies we examined people’s strategies when deciding between multiple routes of 
equivalent length in way-finding tasks. The results reveal the important role of continuing 
behavior when faced with a choice from multiple viable routes. After affirming the existence 
of asymmetric preferences for alternatives (Study 1 & 2), we observed that variations of 
simple known-environment mazes supported action continuation as prevailing process over 
alternative strategies such as preference for long initial path segments, paths with a least 
deviating angle, and a modified hill climbing strategy (Study 3). Moreover, asymmetric 
preferences disappeared with the absence of initial behavior to inform subsequent decision 
making (Study 4). Results are discussed within the context of decision making, navigation 
strategies, and everyday life path finding. 
Keywords: Way-Finding; Asymmetric Preferences; Movement; Spatial Cognition; 
Navigation 
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Moving Onwards: 
An Action Continuation Strategy in Finding the Way 
 Life is replete with choices, ranging from major decisions, such as buying a house, to 
more mundane decisions, such as choosing to wear comfortable versus pretty shoes. Given 
the abundance of choice options in life, it comes as no surprise that a vast amount of 
psychological research addresses people’s judgment, decision making, and problem solving 
(e.g., Baron, 2008; Koehler & Harvey, 2004; Robertson, 2001). Numerous studies have 
sought to unravel the processes involved in choosing between options that differ on one or 
more relevant dimensions (e.g., Triantaphyllou & Mann, 1989); others have explored 
preferences for alternatives with similar expected outcomes (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). Overall, it is evident that decision making is a complex and dynamic process that 
involves many psychological processes, both conscious and unconscious ones (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). 
 After observing in navigation tasks asymmetric preferences for routes of similar 
lengths directed at a common goal (Christenfeld, 1995), numerous scholars have examined 
the processes underlying preferences in such way-finding tasks (e.g., Bailenson, Shum, & 
Uttal, 1998; Bailenson, Shum, & Uttal, 2000; Hochmair & Frank, 2002; Hochmair & 
Karlsson, 2004). Our research further explores people’s preferences and the underlying 
process. We argue that if people have a choice between two paths that seem similar, with one 
that involves an early change of movement and another that involves continued movement, 
they prefer the latter, a strategy that we call action continuation. In our studies, we compared 
this strategy to several alternative strategies, most noteworthy to an initial segment strategy 
(Bailenson et al., 2000), a least angle strategy (Hochmair & Frank, 2002), and a modification 
of the hill climbing strategy (e.g., Robertson, 2001). In the following sections, we will first 
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give an overview of the literature on preferences for one of equivalent routes in navigation 
tasks before we will introduce our approach in more detail. 
Equivalent Options in Navigation Tasks 
People have long been intrigued by navigation tasks with equally valuable outcomes 
of choice alternatives. For example, the famous “Buridan’s ass” paradox, dating back to 
Aristotle, describes the problem of an ass (i.e. donkey) located in the middle of two equally 
attractive stacks of hay (although some versions replace one stack of hay with water; see 
Zupko, 2011). The paradox propagates that the donkey will ultimately starve as it cannot 
develop a preference for either one of the stacks. In this example, the hay options represent 
ways to achieve the goal of eating. In the navigation task we are addressing here there is one 
goal to get to, via equally long routes. Christenfeld (1995) examined people’s behavior when 
faced with several routes of identical length. Bailenson and colleagues (1998; 2000) examined 
whether the length of an initial segment within a navigation route systematically impacts on 
preferences, whereas Hochmair and Frank (2002) studied the influence of segments requiring 
a turn of different angles en route to a target. 
What can people do when being faced with a navigation problem that offers such 
equivalent options (for examples, see Table 1)? One rather unlikely possibility is that people 
refrain from making a decision and simply don’t move, similar to Buridan’s donkey. A 
second possibility would be random patterns of preference. A third possibility would be that 
people systematically prefer one alternative over another. Indeed, literature consistently 
supports the last alternative: preferences for routes of equivalent length leading to the same 
outcome are asymmetric. For example, the pioneering work of Christenfeld (1995) evidences 
that when faced with multiple viable routes of equal length, people choose those that involve 
a turn farthest away from one’s starting position; people seem to postpone turns. 
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Decision Strategies in Navigation Decisions with Equivalent Options 
Why do these asymmetric effects on route preferences emerge? Christenfeld (1995) 
speculated that postponing a turn might result from people’s attempts to minimize mental 
efforts in decision making. General support for this proposition was obtained by subsequent 
studies that documented the impact of heuristics in such navigation tasks. Two important 
accounts are briefly highlighted in the following sections, followed by the alternative 
modified “hill climbing” strategy, and the action continuation strategy that we propose. 
Initial Segment Strategy 
 Extending Christenfeld’s (1995) research, Bailenson and colleagues (2000) tested 
whether asymmetric preferences in navigation tasks with routes of equal length functioned as 
an effort minimizing heuristic and whether the length of route segments was a determining 
factor underlying the phenomenon observed in these prior studies. In a series of experiments, 
Bailenson and colleagues presented people with decision tasks in which they considered 
routes on a map and were requested to select either one of two paths to a target, each 
consisting of segments and turns. Importantly, the authors manipulated the order of the 
segments such that one of the alternatives started with a relatively long straight part of the 
route whereas the other ended with the relatively long straight segment; the paths nonetheless 
yielded equal length. In several alterations of this basic set-up―including variation in the 
amount of turns and altering the general navigation direction―these researchers found that 
people indeed prefer those routes that yield the lengthiest initial segment (i.e. that allowed 
them to postpone turning as long as possible). Moreover, shortening the amount of time that 
people had to process the decision making tasks increased their asymmetric preferences, 
strongly suggesting that the process underlying the choices indeed resembles a simple 
decision making rule or heuristic. 
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Least Angle Strategy 
 Besides the initial segment strategy investigated by Bailenson (2000), Hochmair and 
Frank (2002) proposed another heuristic that might explain the asymmetric preferences 
documented by Christenfeld (1995). Specifically, they introduced a strategy that resembled 
features of a compass routing algorithm (Bose & Morin, 1999): the least angle strategy. 
These researchers reasoned that when choosing what turn to take, people tend to prefer the 
turn that allows them to travel with the least deviating angle from their orientation towards the 
goal. Thus, when faced with the decision of whether or not to take a turn, people will choose 
the route that most closely resembles a straight path towards their destination. Indeed, several 
studies conducted by Hochmair and Karlsson (2004) indicate that people have a preference 
for those routes that show the least angle of deviation in relation to the target. This strategy 
has so far been studied in unknown environments, that is, settings in which people are 
unaware of the exact layout of the map, yet there is no reason to assume that this strategy is 
exclusive to such unknown environment contexts only. Indeed, Hochmair and Frank (2002) 
offer the least angle strategy as a potential explanation for Christenfeld’s (1995) finding on 
behavior in known environments. 
 The least angle strategy and the initial segment predict similar choices when people 
are faced with navigation tasks in which the first segment is both the longest and yields the 
least deviating angle, such as in the tasks used by Christenfeld (1995; for another example, 
see Table 1; a). However, they make notably different predictions in other contexts, 
specifically when the path yielding the longest initial segment angles away from the straight 
line to the goal to a greater extent than the short initial segment alternative. In examining 
situations like these, Hochmair and Karlsson (2004) found support for dominance of the least 
angle strategy over the initial segment strategy in predicting navigation behaviors, at least 
within an unknown environment context. 
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Immediate Proximity 
 Besides the strategies outlined above, people may prefer paths that seem to take them 
immediately in closest proximity of their target. In navigation tasks where the required 
horizontal difference between the starting position and the target location is greater than the 
vertical difference with the destination, traveling a distance horizontally takes people in closer 
direct proximity compared to when the same distance is travelled vertically, as propagated by 
the Pythagorean Theorem. Thus, people may simply choose a route that takes them as 
proximal to the target as quickly as possible, although the total required traveling distance for 
both alternatives is equal. 
The possibility that people may seek to reduce their immediate proximity in way-
finding behavior can be interpreted as a specific case of a hill climbing strategy, in which 
people attempt to solve problems by forming and pursuing more easily obtained subgoals. As 
an example, one can think of the subgoals to first dominate the center on the board when 
playing chess and then seeking to capture the component’s Queen prior to attempting check-
mate. Although hill climbing can be problematic when solving a problem requires behavior 
that at some point increases the distance to the end-goal, such as in the Tower of Hanoi or 
Missionaries and Cannibals problems, this strategy is nonetheless used by people in many 
problem solving tasks (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972; Robertson, 2001; Simon & Reed, 1976; 
Thomas, 1974). One possibility is thus that systematic preferences observed in the navigation 
problems studied by Christenfeld reflect the default use of a modified hill climbing strategy 
commonly observed in solving more complex problems. 
Action Continuation Strategy 
 Although the above strategies provide plausible explanations for the asymmetric 
preferences observed in Christenfeld’s (1995) research on navigation behavior in known 
environments, we propose an alternative, more succinct, explanation: people prefer to 
ACTION CONTINUATION IN FINDING THE WAY 8 
continue their course of action if alternative courses do not seem beneficial or necessary. 
Thus, even though the observations by Christenfield are consistent with the other strategies, 
we pose that the action continuation strategy best explains people’s preferences when 
navigating in such environments. 
 Specifically, the proposed action continuation strategy shares features with other 
prominent theories in problem solving and self-regulation. The classic “test-operate-test-exit” 
(TOTE) model in problem solving (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) and theories of self-
regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998) hold that attempts to amend behavior is critically 
dependent on monitoring and feedback processes during goal pursuit. People adjust behavior 
based on what the “test” data suggests, that is, people monitor whether current behavior is an 
effective means for achieving the target goal (e.g., Vroom, 1964). More specifically, progress 
monitoring theory (MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001) poses that for solving rather 
complex problems a person is most likely to abandon an ineffective strategy when the relative 
effort or time spent using the selected strategy is perceived to outweigh the actual progress 
made, reflecting a phenomenon referred to as criterion-failure. In a study, Ormerod, 
MacGregor, and Chrinocle (2002) examined people’s ability to solve different versions of the 
8-coin problem, in which a set of coins needs to be rearranged to make each coin touch 
exactly 3 others; the counter-intuitive solution is to place coins on top of others. Importantly, 
people were more likely to find the correct solution to this problem when the coins were 
arranged in such that the problem yielded no valid first moves in two dimensions. As a result 
of immediately failing to find moves in two-dimensions, participants were more likely to 
consider the (successful) use of three dimensions. These findings suggest that problem 
solving can benefit from the presence of negative feedback regarding ineffective strategies. 
Although the decision making processes such as in the 8-coin problem are arguably more 
complex than way-finding in known environments, this observation nonetheless suggests that 
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in the absence of cues that suggest the need for a change in strategy, people are inclined to 
continue their current course of action. 
 Moreover, an action continuation strategy is consistent with the notion that people 
utilize strategies in movement behavior that minimize cost functions (e.g., inaccuracy, energy, 
time etc.; Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2009) where changing behavior may be 
considered costly. Indeed, switching between tasks is considered to be expensive (e.g., Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995), and underlies psychological phenomena such as performance on the 
implicit association test (e.g., Klauer & Mierke, 2005). In line with the action continuation 
principle, changing the engagement from one particular task to another requires effortful 
suppression of the original task, a phenomenon called task-set inertia (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994). Moreover, decision making research attests people’s tendency to rely on the 
status quo or prior attained anchors when making decisions (e.g., Jacowitz & Kahneman, 
1995; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). 
Importantly, the action continuation strategy is a straightforward process in way-
finding behaviors in known environments. That is, besides being broadly consistent with 
research in other domains of decision making, this strategy offers a highly parsimonious 
explanation of way-finding. Moreover, this strategy allows for testable predictions and 
comparisons to alternative strategies that seem to explain way-finding. 
 To illustrate how this account differs from the previous in its predictions, consider the 
following navigation setting: One approaches from a horizontal path and can choose from two 
routes towards a goal that is located at a greater vertical distance than horizontal distance in 
Euclidean space. A first alternative route requites an early turn immediately into long vertical 
path (hence long initial segment), whereas a second route starts with the relatively short 
horizontal segment (see Table 1; b for an illustration). According to the initial segment 
approach, people will opt for the first turn, ending up in the first long vertical segment. The 
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least angle strategy would predict a similar preference given that the first vertical path yields a 
smaller deviating angle from a straight line towards the goal relative to the upper horizontal 
segment. Also the immediate proximity strategy would predict taking the first turn as 
movement in this direction is associated with a smaller immediate direct distance from the 
goal compared to the alternative. The action continuation strategy, however, would predict 
otherwise: the upper horizontal segment allows for the continuation of behavior (the original 
horizontal navigation direction), leading to preferences for the upper path, regardless of its 
relatively short length and large deviating angle. 
The Current Research 
 In a series of four studies, we systematically examined whether people use an action 
continuation strategy as part of way-finding in known environments. In Study 1 and 2, we 
first sought to establish the phenomenon of asymmetric preferences as identified by 
Christenfeld (1995). This was done by embedding a choice between two equally lengthy 
routes within a maze through which people were required to trace a path and by asking people 
to walk through a large chalk-drawn maze. In Study 3, we presented people with different 
versions of the original maze that allowed us to contrast predictions based on the action 
continuation strategy against the initial segment, the least angle, and immediate proximity 
strategy. After finding overall support for the action continuation strategy, we tested whether 
asymmetric preferences disappeared when we took away the presence of navigation behavior 
prior to path choices in Study 4. Table 1 summarizes the predictions of each of the alternative 
accounts across the studies. 
Study 1: An Embedded Multiple-Route Maze 
Study 1 was designed as a first test of whether people display asymmetric preferences 
in a navigation task with two distinct but functionally equivalent solutions. Inspired by earlier 
work of Christenfeld (1995), we investigated this navigation problem in the context of a maze 
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puzzle. Participants were presented with a printed maze in which they had to find the route 
from the entrance to the exit and the maze embedded a choice between two routes that both 
led to a viable solution after the same distance traveled (see Figure 1). We predicted that 
people would navigate through the maze by opting for the route involving the latest turn: we 
expected that the odds for choosing the “upper path” over the “lower path” would be higher 
when navigating from west to east, relative to when navigating from east to west. 
Method 
 Fifty-one students (Mage = 20.98, SD = 4.31; 31 women, 19 men, 1 undisclosed) on the 
University of Limerick campus agreed to voluntarily participate in this paper-and-pencil 
study. After giving informed consent, participants traced a line through a maze from a 
location labeled “start” to “finish.” Importantly, participants were randomly assigned to a 
version of the maze in which they went from west to east, or from east to west; the location of 
the labels “start” and “finish” were varied accordingly. After tracing the line, participants 
reported demographic information before they were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
Results and Discussion 
 A Chi-Square test indicated that choices for either the upper path versus the lower path 
were conditional on the direction through the maze, χ2(1) = 10.85, p < .001, φ = 0.46 (Figure 
2). Specifically, whereas 60% of participants choose the upper path when going from west to 
east, only 15% choose to do so when traversing from east to west. Thus, the probabilities of 
selecting the upper or lower routes are not identical across directions, even though the 
instrumentality of the paths are functionally equivalent regardless of whether going from west 
to east or from east to west. These results are consistent with the patterns observed by 
Christenfeld (1995). 
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Study 2: Behavioral Replication 
 The previous study confirmed the prediction that people prefer to continue their course 
of action before changing it in rather than the reverse in the domain of way-finding and they 
were consistent with the results first documented by Christenfeld (1995). Ultimately, the 
results obtained from this research should translate to actual navigations rather than drawing 
lines through mazes. Hence, prior to capitalizing on testing the action continuation strategy 
against alternative accounts, we sought to extend the basic pattern of results into a behavioral 
context. To this end, we asked people to walk through a known-environment chalk-drawn 
maze consisting of the identical options element that was embedded in the larger maze of 
Study 1. The part of the maze that involved a decision between the two paths is henceforward 
referred to as the “default maze” (Table 1; a). 
Method 
Thirty-five passing people (Mage = 22.56; SD = 6.51; 18 women, 17 men) on the main 
campus square were asked if they wanted to partake in the current study. After giving 
informed consent, participants were led to an entrance of a chalk maze, which was 
approximately 5m by 1.5m, with paths approximately 50cm wide. The horizontal and vertical 
segments from the turn point measured approximately 1m and 2.5m (measured from the 
middle of the path), and participants could see the entire layout of the maze. Participants were 
randomly led to either the west or the east side of the maze and were asked to walk to the exit 
on the other side without crossing the chalk lines. Participants’ choices were recorded and 
they provided demographic information afterwards. Upon completion of the study, 
participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results and Discussion 
 A Chi-Square test indicated that choices for either the upper path versus the lower path 
were conditional on the direction through the maze, χ2(1) = 4.27, p = .04, φ = 0.35 (Figure 2). 
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Specifically, whereas 53% of the participants choose the upper path when going from west to 
east, only 19% did so when going from east to west. These behavioral results essentially 
replicated those of Study 1, demonstrating them across different types of actions, namely 
drawing lines through a maze and walking through a maze. We proceeded in Study 3 by 
plotting the action continuation strategy against alternative accounts. 
Study 3: Contrasting Accounts 
The results of Study 1 and 2 suggest that participants’ relative preferences for the 
upper over the lower route were higher when the former option allowed them to maintain 
their course of action and vice versa. Although this pattern is consistent with the proposed 
action continuation strategy, it is also consistent with alternative accounts. First of all, people 
may use a hill climbing strategy in which they try to immediately get as proximal as possible 
to the desired location. Although both routes are identical in total length, people are at a 
greater distance from the exit “as the crow flies” after traversing the first turn compared to 
when travelling the same distance through the path that does not require taking the first turn. 
Second, besides allowing the continuation of the ongoing course of action, the preferred paths 
also yielded the longest initial segments (Bailenson et al., 1998; 2000). Third, the deviating 
angle of the preferred paths was smaller than those of their alternatives, which is consistent 
with the least angle strategy (Hochmair & Frank, 2002). Besides these established strategies, 
one might even argue that people might simply have decided to “stay on the left”, similar to 
navigation in traffic within the country of study. In the current study we presented people with 
variations of the default maze to contrast predictions of each of these accounts against each 
other. 
Method 
Ninety-four students (Mage = 20.49; SD = 3.30; 60 women, 34 men) on campus agreed 
to partake in this paper-and-pencil study. After giving informed consent, participants traced a 
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line through four non-embedded maze-puzzles. We tested the action continuation strategy and 
the abovementioned alternative accounts by using modified versions of the task from Study 2. 
The default maze yielded initial segments of 2.5cm and 0.7cm (measured from the middle of 
the path starting at the turn location), with deviation angles of 10.66° and 79.34° respectively. 
A “magnitude” of immediate proximity by moving through either path towards the exit can be 
represented by calculating the value for the derivative of the function describing the absolute 
distance between one’s position in the maze and the coordinates of the exit: 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
=
𝑥
√𝑥2 + 𝑦2
 
 Where 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
 is the magnitude of getting closer from the turning point to the exit by (1) 
going through the horizontal path in which case x denotes the horizontal distance to the exit, 
and y indicates the vertical distance to the exit, or by (2) taking the vertical path in which the 
roles of x and y are reversed within the formula. For the current default maze these values 
when continuing present action versus taking a turn were, 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
 = 0.98 (horizontal path “utility”), 
and 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑦
 = 0.21 (vertical path “utility”).  
Besides (a) the “default maze”, we included three other mazes, which we will refer to 
as (b) the “extended maze”, (c) the “symmetric maze” and (d) the “turned maze” (see Table 
1). The order of these mazes was varied following a Latin-square rotation and the navigation 
direction was manipulated between subjects. After completing the tasks, participants reported 
demographic information, were debriefed, and were thanked. 
The extended maze. To plot the predictions based on the action continuation strategy 
against the initial segment, least angle, and immediate proximity strategies, we altered the 
default maze by extending its vertical segments between the turn points (2.3cm) and similarly 
shortening the horizontal segment (0.7cm), leading to different deviating angles, 51.06° and 
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38.94°, respectively, and modified distance derivatives, 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
 = 0.40, and 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑦
 = 0.92, respectively. 
Based on the action continuation strategy, we still predicted the relative odds for choosing the 
upper over the lower path to be greater when navigating from west to east compared east to 
west, as for the default maze. However, by making the horizontal paths shorter than the 
vertical paths, the initial segment strategy makes the opposite prediction, as taking the lower 
path now yielded the longer initial segment when traversing from west to east as does the 
upper path when going from east to west. Similarly, the least angle strategy predicts 
preferences for the lower path when going from west to east given that the deviating angle of 
the vertical path was smaller than that of the horizontal alternative, and vice versa when going 
from east to west. Finally the immediate proximity account led to the opposite predicted 
pattern of preferences compared to the action continuation strategy. 
The turned maze. Rather than having the entrance and exit on the west and east side, 
the turned maze differed from the default by including the entrance and exit at the top and 
bottom, which was done by rotating these parts by 90º, leaving the segments after the turn 
unaltered. The turned maze served two important purposes. First, an action continuation 
strategy would lead to the opposite prediction compared to the default maze: it was predicted 
that navigating from west to east should lead to a reduced likelihood to opt for the upper path 
versus lower path compared to when navigating from east to west. This follows from the fact 
that in this version of the maze, the lower path now required no initial turn when going from 
west to east and vice versa. Thus, based on the action continuation strategy a reversal of the 
pattern observed in Study 1 and 2 was anticipated.  
Second, the turned maze provided an additional test against the alternative strategies. 
The initial segment account, for example, leads to a predicted preference for the upper path 
when traversing from west to east and a lower path preference when going from east to west, 
as each of the horizontal segments originating at the turn are longer relative to the 
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corresponding vertical segments. Also behavior based on the stay on the left proposition was 
different from the action continuation strategy, as was the case immediate proximity strategy, 
which would lead participants to take the first turn which yielded a higher distance derivative 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
 = 0.87, relative to going straight, 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑦
 = 0.49, resulting in relatively greater odds for choosing 
the upper over the lower path when navigating from west to east versus east to west. Further, 
the design allowed us to test the predictions based on the action continuation strategy also 
against the least angle strategy. According to the least angle strategy, navigators would be 
expected to have no clear preference for either one of the path because the angles were 
approximately the same (44.80° vs. 45.20°).   
The symmetric maze. The last variation on the default maze consisted of relocating 
the entrance and exit at the middle of the upper and lower paths, hence requiring a turn 
regardless of which path was chosen. This alteration provided the opportunity to plot the 
action continuation strategy against the stay on the left account. Specifically, if taking a turn 
is an inevitable act regardless of which route is chosen―and both paths hence require a 
change―then the odds should not differ across navigation directions according to the action 
continuation strategy. According to the stay on the left account, however, the upper path 
should be chosen more frequently over the lower path when navigating from west to east 
compared to from east to west. In this maze variation, also the initial segments became equal 
(0.7cm), as did the deviating angles (90°), and the distance derivatives (
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑦
 = 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
). 
Results and Discussion 
 The default maze. A Chi-Square test indicated that choices for either the upper path 
versus the lower path were conditional on the direction through the maze, χ2(1) = 7.24, p < 
.01, φ = 0.28 (Figure 2). Specifically, 68% of participants choose the upper path when going 
from west to east, compared to 40% when going from east to west. These results essentially 
replicate those of Study 1 and 2. 
ACTION CONTINUATION IN FINDING THE WAY 17 
The extended maze. A Chi-Square test indicated that choices for either the upper path 
versus the lower path were again conditional on the direction through the maze, χ2(1) = 5.16, 
p = .02, φ = 0.23 (Figure 2). A similar pattern was observed as for the default maze: 60% of 
participants choose the upper path when going from west to east relative to the 36% among 
those who went from east to west. These results support the predictions made based an action 
continuation strategy as well as the stay on the left account, but they are inconsistent with the 
predictions based on the initial segment, least angle, and immediate proximity strategy. 
The turned maze. A Chi-Square test indicated that choices for the upper path versus 
the lower path were indeed dependent on the direction through the maze, χ2(1) = 14.93, p < 
.001, φ = 0.40 (Figure 2). The opposite pattern was observed compared to the default maze: 
only 17% of participants choose the upper path when going from west to east,, as opposed to 
55% among those who completed the maze from east to west were. This reversal is consistent 
with the predictions based on the action continuation strategy, but contradicts the predictions 
based on all other accounts. 
The symmetric maze. As opposed to the prior mazes, a Chi-Square test indicated no 
reliable difference in the choices for the upper path over the lower path across the two 
directions, χ2(1) = 1.11, p = .29, φ = 0.11 (Figure 2). Specifically, the percentage of 
participants choosing the upper over the lower path when navigating from west to east, 66%, 
did not significantly differ from the 55% who did so when going from east to west. These 
results contradict the predictions made based on the stay on the left account. 
Across the above four mazes, the action continuation strategy was tested and plotted 
against the alternative initial segment strategy, the least angle strategy, the immediate 
proximity strategy, and a stay on the left account. Taken together, the results regarding the 
four mazes confirm the predictions based on the action continuation strategy. Moreover, the 
results of the maze variations were inconsistent with the predictions based on the other 
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accounts, lending overall support for an action continuation strategy in choosing between 
identical options in navigation tasks in a known environment, here in the context of drawn 
paths through mazes. 
In relation to the least angle strategy in particular, it should be noted that the various 
maze variations yielded relatively low differences in deviation angles of paths. As a result, 
these studies may have somewhat underestimated the impact that the least angle strategy has 
in predicting choices. Moreover, the study employed drawn paths rather than more realistic 
navigation behavior in movement.  
Study 4: Behavioral Replication and Direct Test of the Action Continuation Strategy 
 The previous study supports the action continuation strategy as process that informs 
decision making when faced with identical options. Study 4 was designed as a behavioral test 
of the action continuation strategy and it tested a crucial assumption of the action continuation 
strategy: the preferences as predicted would only occur after initial movement, that is, the 
particular action that is continued. Furniture was arranged to reflect the default maze. By 
adjusting people’s starting positions in the maze we were able to manipulate whether or not 
choosing to go straight equaled a continuation of ongoing behavior. Specifically, by excluding 
behavior in the segment prior to the turn, we were able to remove earlier navigation behavior 
as the basis for the decision. We reasoned that if no initial action (i.e., movement) precedes 
the decision at the turning point (i.e., when no continuation is possible), then the navigation 
direction would no longer affect choices (Table 1; e). 
Method 
 Forty-six people (Mage = 23.37, SD = 9.36; 24 women, 22 men) passing by on campus 
were asked for their voluntary participation in this field study. As opposed to completing each 
maze (Study 3), participants were assigned to either one of two maze variations (default maze 
vs. effortless maze) that were created using tables and chairs.  
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The default maze. The default maze measured approximately 5.5m by 2.50m, with 
open paths of approximately 50cm wide enclosed by furniture that was around 1m high. From 
the turn position, the horizontal and vertical segments measured approximately 1m and 3m, 
respectively (measured from the middle of the path), with deviating angles of 13.24° and 
76.76°, respectively, and corresponding distance derivatives of 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑥
 = 0.97 and 
𝛿𝑓
𝛿𝑦
 = 0.23. 
In addition, we varied the navigation direction by asking people to first walk from 
west to east, and then from east to west. This was done by first positioning participants at the 
west side of the maze with a first experimenter, who instructed them to walk to a second 
experimenter located at the east side of the maze. At the east side, participants received a form 
on which they listed demographic information. They then returned this form back to first 
experimenter who gave a debriefing and thanked them for their participation. The chosen 
routes were recorded. 
 The effortless maze. We adjusted the default maze (see Table 1) by excluding the 
lead in movement before the turning point. Given that we took away the required effort for 
traversing some distance towards the choice location we labeled this the effortless maze.  
Specifically, participants walked through the maze without first completing the horizontal 
paths at the east and west entrances. As a result, choosing either the upper path or the lower 
path did no longer involve a deviation from prior navigation behavior. The initial segments’ 
lengths remain unaltered by this procedure, and also the deviating angles and derivatives 
remained the same.  
Results and Discussion
 
 The default maze. A Chi-Square test on the disaggregated data indicated that choices 
for either the upper path versus the lower path were depended on the direction through the 
maze, χ2(1) = 7.04, p < .01, φ = .39 (Figure 2). Consistent with the previous studies, 70% of 
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participants choose the upper path when going from west to east, versus 30% who did so 
when travelling from east to west. 
The effortless maze. A Chi-Square test on the disaggregated data indicated that 
choices for either the upper path versus the lower path were not reliably affected by the 
navigation direction, χ2(1) = 0.35, p = .55, φ = 0.09 (Figure 2). Specifically, the difference in 
the percentages of participants choosing the upper over the lower path when navigating from 
west to east, 61%, did not significantly differ among those going from east to west, 52%. 
These results are consistent with the prediction that no clear preference for one of the paths 
would emerge when the two decision options require a change in behavior. 
General Discussion 
 In recent years an increasing amount of research addressed way-finding in the context 
of “identical options”, that is, decisions between paths that yield the same required investment 
to reach a common target. This novel interest is not surprising given that the asymmetric 
patterns of preference within such tasks shed light on basic problem solving strategies when 
people are faced with equivalent options. Whereas past research has suggested reliance on the 
initial segment and least angle strategies, we examined in four studies whether people rely on 
the action continuation strategy.  
 We tested the hypothesized action continuation strategy and contrasted it against the 
initial segment and least angle strategies as well as against predictions of a modified hill 
climbing approach labeled immediate proximity strategy. The first pair of studies revealed the 
asymmetric preferences documented in earlier research (Christenfeld, 1995) in the context of 
a paper-and-pencil maze (Study 1) as well as in the context of walking behavior (Study 2). In 
Study 3, the features of this maze were manipulated such that we were able to directly test the 
four abovementioned strategies against each other. The results were consistent with the action 
continuation strategy but not with the alternative accounts. For example, a shift in the angle of 
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the default maze’s starting segment, leading to the turned maze, resulted in the reversal of 
preferences as predicted according to the action continuation account, but inconsistent with an 
initial segment approach, least angle strategy, or immediate proximity goal. Specifically, the 
switch did not affect the length of the initial segments originating at the point where 
participants were required to decide between paths but it did switch which path offered a 
continuation of the original direction. Similarly, the deviation angles of the two paths in this 
turned maze were approximately equivalent, leading the least angle strategy to predict similar 
preferences for either path. Results indicated, however, that the path offering a continuation of 
behavior was preferred, hence deviating from the equal preferences predicted by the least 
angle strategy, and these preferred paths also did start with the longest initial segment. 
It should be noted, however, that the variations in the mazes used in Study 3 were 
perhaps too small to be completely confident in concluding that the action continuation 
strategy dominates over the least angle strategy. In addition, Study 3 utilized drawn mazes 
rather than more everyday life navigation behavior such as walking. Accordingly, we wish to 
express some caution about our manipulation of the least angle strategy as our test may not 
have been optimal.  
Importantly, the behavioral examination in Study 4 indicated that the asymmetric 
preferences disappeared when the initial behavior was removed (i.e. people’s first behavior 
was making a choice between paths rather than first travelling towards the choice location). In 
addition, this result was obtained without modifying any other properties of the maze (e.g., 
segment lengths, deviation angles), which suggests that this difference in behavior can indeed 
be attributed to the action continuation strategy in particular. Overall, these results support our 
proposition that people at least in part use action continuation strategies in way-finding 
behavior within known environments. 
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Contributions, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 The current research provides contributions to the study of cognitive processes at work 
when navigating in known environments. Consistent with earlier studies in decision making 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), our findings reveal that choices from equally utile 
options, in the context of way-finding, are nonetheless asymmetrically valued. In navigating, 
people seem to use their current engagement to inform what to do when faced with decisions, 
favoring those alternatives that allow the continuation of their present traversing direction. 
This finding fits well into perspectives that emphasize the use of basic strategies in problem 
solving and decision making (e.g., Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982; Plous, 1993). 
 The current research sheds light on how people make navigation decisions and how in 
particular an action continuation strategy underlies these choices. However, the present 
investigation also touches on issues that are more fundamental to the understanding 
behavioral navigation and movement, in particular the optimization functions that underlie 
planning and execution of behavior. An underlying assumption of each of the studied 
strategies is that there must be some utilitarian benefit inherent to the strategies. To illustrate, 
the wide use of heuristics such as availability (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) stems from 
its relatively high efficiency in terms of time and effort relative to expenses in accuracy. 
Research into motor action planning (e.g., Trommershäuser, Landy, & Maloney, 2006) 
evidences striking convergence between expected utility models of motor tasks and actual 
human behavior (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2009). Indeed, behaviors such as eye 
and arm movements closely resemble theoretically predicted optimums in expected gains 
(e.g., high accuracy, small energy expenditure). Possibly, the action continuation strategy 
similarly optimizes a costs vs. benefits tradeoff. Consistent with this proposition, switching 
from an ongoing activity is generally costly in terms of accuracy and time (Allport et al., 
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1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and future research may identify the action continuation 
strategy as an expression of a more general cost-saving process in the context of way-finding 
behavior. 
Originally, Christenfeld (1995) proposed that the asymmetric choices in navigation 
behavior may follow from the minimization of mental effort, a suggestion that was 
substantiated by Bailenson and colleagues (2000). It is plausible that such a process also 
underlies the action continuation strategy. Specifically, given the presumably high frequency 
with which people encounter navigation situations with multiple equivalent viable routes in 
daily life, a simple action continuation heuristic would reduce the frequent use of energy 
otherwise required when a separate thought-through decision would need to be made on each 
occasion. Speculatively, the energy saved by an action continuation strategy might even 
surpass small benefits in time and distance across paths when alternative routes are not 
identical in length. Examining the detailed biomechanical implications of the action 
continuation strategy went beyond the scope of the current investigation but yields an exciting 
future direction that may help uncover fundamentals in the economics of navigation. 
In addition to the above, our research offers practical implications for real-world 
contexts. Navigation is a fundamental aspect of everyday life, highly relevant in contexts such 
as traffic, consumer behavior, and crowd management. In these settings, people are perhaps 
disinclined to divert from their current behavior, at least when the environment is known. This 
knowledge may be used to for example optimize traffic flow or to navigate people in a fast 
and safe way out of dangerous situations that may restrict the cognitive resources or time 
available for making deliberate decisions. For example, an implication from our research can 
be that when people are guided through traffic or large crowds, people may find their way 
easier, more efficiently, and perhaps also safer when an action continuation path was possible 
and recommended. The majority of people would “prefer” such a path; and if other people 
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moved from a different direction, using a different path that followed the action continuation 
principle, then the streams were least likely to collide. Similarly, in supporting healthy eating 
via placement of products in shops, it may pay off to present healthy products in isles located 
on the straight path from the entrance rather than the alternative. Future research will do well 
to examine whether the action continuation behavior indeed works in such settings, for 
example by comparing behavior across existing environments.  
Interestingly, results for some of the tasks used in these studies revealed a general 
reference for lower path. Although we did not focus on this particular phenomenon, people 
may perhaps find it less effortful to draw lines the lower paths given that these require less 
extension of the arm, which would explain a somewhat general tendency to prefer the lower 
path. Importantly, the manipulation of navigation direction of navigation in these allowed us 
to test the action continuation strategy regardless of such general preferences. Nonetheless, 
this intriguing general preference may offer a future direction for identifying navigation 
processes complimentary to the action continuation strategy. 
Note that even though our results supported an action continuation strategy rather than 
the least angle strategy, the emergence of preferences for routes that involve the smallest 
deviating angle has been examined by Hochmair and Karlsson (2004) in settings that yield a 
key difference to the tasks investigated in the current research: These authors focused on 
unknown environments where people saw the target location, but were not knowledgeable of 
the exact layout of the routes that might get them there. Possibly, situations in which the exact 
layout of paths is unknown makes people engage in more effortful and thought trough 
decisions, hence reducing the reliance on a default action continuation. It would be 
worthwhile to examine in future studies the extent to which participants are able to verbalize 
the reasons behind their behavior and to see what part of their choice processes is available to 
consciousness. This future research should also examine the trade-off between action 
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continuation strategies and least angle strategies in which the difference between deviation 
angles are more extreme compared to those used in our study to examine whether the least 
angle strategy might become more prevalent with greater differences in deviation angles. 
Extending on the above, the current studies were primarily developed to examine 
whether the action continuation strategy offers an explanations that better suits observed 
patterns in decision making relative to the other accounts. An alternative approach to be 
examined in future research would be to test whether people can use a mix of different 
strategies with each given a particular weight (e.g., Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 
2008). Although such an examination goes beyond the scope of the current project that sought 
to identify the existence of an action continuation strategy, future research could examine the 
relative contributions of each of the strategies by changing the decision tasks in more ways 
than we did. For example, the use of strategies may shift towards the use of least angles with 
increasing uncertainty about the exact location of the goal. 
In contrast to tasks such playing chess, the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, missionaries and 
cannibals problems, or the 8-coin dilemma (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972; Ormerod, 
MacGregor, & Chrinocle, 2002; Robertson, 2001; Simon & Reed, 1976; Thomas, 1974), the 
navigation “problems” that were used in the current research were very easy to solve. Could 
our findings nonetheless be integrated with theories of problem solving in more complex 
contexts? Indeed, the importance of negative feedback on efficient problem solving progress 
is consistent with the general processes postulated in the classic TOTE model in problem 
solving (Miller et al., 1960) and theories of self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
Recent findings in problem solving evidence the importance of negative feedback (e.g., 
MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001), for without negative feedback people may fail to 
alter ongoing behavior. Although many problem solving tasks and the currently examined 
navigation environment are very different in terms of complexity, our research highlights a 
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fundamental process that is potentially applicable to many other forms of problem solving and 
decision making. 
Conclusion 
Building on way-finding behavior research by Christenfeld (1995), we examined 
strategies that people employ when deciding between routes of equal length towards a goal in 
known environments. After contrasting various strategies against each other, including 
preferences for longest initial segments (e.g., Bailenson et al., 2000), preferences for 
movement in least deviating angles (e.g., Hochmair & Frank, 2002), and preferences for 
directions that temporarily increase one’s direct proximity to the target, our results suggest 
that people often prefer to take the route that allows for the continuation of the original 
direction. Overall, it appears that when people face a choice between functionally equivalent 
routes, they partly modify their preferences in accordance with the option that allows them to 
just keep on going before changing one’s route. 
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Note: Shaded cells indicate critical differences in predictions compared to the action continuation strategy. 
 
Table 1 
Predicted Decision for the Upper vs. Lower Path According to Each Strategy 
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(d) 
  
 
 
(e) 
 Default  Extended  Turned  Symmetric  Effortless 
  W→E W←E  W→E W←E  W→E W←E  W→E W←E  W→E W←E 
Action Continuation Upper Lower  Upper Lower  Lower Upper  Equal Equal  Equal Equal 
Initial Segment Upper Lower  Lower Upper  Upper Lower  Equal Equal  Upper Lower 
Least Angle Upper Lower  Lower Upper  Equal Equal  Equal Equal  Upper Lower 
Immediate Proximity Upper Lower  Lower Upper  Upper Lower  Equal Equal  Upper Lower 
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Figure 1: The Embedded Identical Options Maze (Study 1) 
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Figure 2: Ln(Odds) of Choosing Upper over Lower Paths Across all Studies 
 
Note: An Ln(Odds) of 0 indicates equal preference for upper and lower paths. Positive values indicate a greater preference for the upper paths, 
whereas negative values indicate higher selection of the lower paths. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ** p < .001, ns p > .05. 
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